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Do Political Contributions Purchase Regulatory Discretion in Coal Mine Inspections?

BY:
NEIL MALANI
ABSTRACT

A vast literature acknowledges the corruptibility of regulators; however, empirical tests on the
matter have been limited to two-agent models examining the rulemaking process and price
regulation of natural monopolies. It remains an open question whether political contributions, by
driving legislative pressure, can entice laxity from regulators in their application of the rules. To
remedy this issue, I observe the highly-regulated coal mining industry for which there exists
several points for inspector discretion. By comparing the outcomes with Congressional coal
mining contribution levels, I am able to ascertain capture across several dimensions. Specifically,
I find that contributions are associated with agency inspectors using their discretion to preempt
violations requiring follow-up inspection, grant more inspections to waive safety requirements,
conduct shorter inspections, and grant lower penalties. It is troubling that these findings occur at
relatively low levels of contributions, suggesting a high level of corruptibility on the part of
regulators.

Ronald Reagan once quipped, “It's been said that politics is the second oldest profession.
I have learned that it bears a striking resemblance to the first.” Indeed, the conception of the
corrupt politician selling preferential treatment and favors for campaign contributions has been
recognizable, albeit declining, for more than a century. In particular, the narrative that the flood
of contributions by businesses (and their millionaire owners) is leading to the corporate takeover
of American politics has been “repeated so constantly and with such vehemence that it has
become for millions of Americans an article of faith” (Wilkinson 2012). These concerns have
only been amplified by the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission (558 U.S. 310), in which the Court, striking down prohibitions on independent
corporate expenditures, held that while independent expenditures by corporations might result in
“influence over or access to elected officials,” they “do not give rise to corruption or the
appearance of corruption.”
As early as 1934, with the creation of the American Liberty League, businessmen have
been working to ameliorate their concern that “business, which bears the responsibility for the
paychecks of private employment, has little voice in government.” Those early efforts collapsed
(the League was disbanded in 1940); however, the role and amount of corporate expenditures in
politics has only grown since then. Nevertheless, the full extent of what this money purchases is
still unclear. Indeed, if any market sector ought to know how best to spend, it ought to be the one
responsible for making and executing trades: the financial services industry. Nevertheless, in the
past election Wall Street donations to the losing candidate accumulated un-hedged. Center for
Responsible Politics data reveals that Governor Mitt Romney’s top 5 contributors were all major
banks: Goldman Sachs, Bank of America, Morgan Stanley, JP Morgan Chase & Co., Credit
Suisse Group (Phillips 2012). More than 82% of individual donations from the hedge fund and
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private equity industries went to Governor Romney.
Excluding this anecdotal evidence, there is very little evidence to suggest that corporate
political expenditures have a significant impact on the outcome of legislative decisions. Burstein
(2003) review the literature on public opinion and public policy, and find that the former was key
driver of the latter: “[p]ublic opinion affects policy three-quarters of the times its impact is
gauged; its effect is of substantial policy importance at least a third of the time, and probably a
fair amount more.” Surveying almost 40 studies with various specifications examining the
outcome of various roll call votes, Ansolabehere, et al. (2003) find that “campaign contributions
had no statistically significant effects on legislation or had the ‘wrong’ sign.” To the extent that
evidence exists suggesting a rational purpose for contributions, it is limited to work by Stratmann
(1991), amongst others, who models contributions as spending on electoral outcomes (i.e.
contributions help elect like-mined representatives).
On this analysis alone, it makes little sense for corporations to contribute to political
campaigns. Of course this ignores one key limitation of the above analysis – legislative votes are
not the only decisions made by either legislators or the federal government writ large. Indeed,
legislators are also responsible for mandating, budgeting, and overseeing various federal
agencies. Research on the role of expenditures in purchasing preferable treatment from these
executive and independent agencies, however, has been limited. There is certainly evidence to
suggest that regulators are not incorruptible – there exists a broad literature on regulatory
capture, which has been discussed extensively since the 1960s. Initially, the term was only used
in a narrow sense, specifically to refer to the mechanisms by which regulated monopolies exert
control over state bodies that are supposed to be controlling the firm. Dal Bó (2006) provides a
definition more aligned with present day usage: “the process through which special interests

2

affect state intervention in any of its forms, which can include areas as diverse as the setting of
monetary policy, or legislation affecting R&D.” The specific nature of this process has not,
however, been discussed extensively. If contributions do, in fact, drive capture, then there exists
a rationale beyond the mere “appearance of corruption” for restricting corporate political
expenditures. For good governance groups to craft effective legislation combating the perceived
problem, it then becomes critical to identify (a) if contributions impact outcomes and (b) if so, by
what mechanism are those favors pressed into place.
In this paper, I decline to tackle the second as it is largely unobservable – few if any
Congressmen are tactless enough directly order agencies to be lenient on contributors (the
Keating Five Scandal provides an interesting counterpoint). Further and more importantly, it is
difficult to systematically observe all orders, conversation, and other methods of influence
required to test hypotheses regarding the mechanism. Using data set comprised of Mine Safety
and Health Administration (MSHA) inspections, I address the first question by examining
whether contributions are systematically related to regulatory leniency. Isolating mine and
inspection geography, I am able to examine the association between contributions, and
inspection frequency and outcomes. I find limited evidence to support the proposition that
contributions change the pattern of inspections and more conclusive evidence to support the
proposition that contributions are responsible for lower quality inspections.
I. Background
Well before the economic literature began to develop a theory of capture, political
scientists had begun observing factors that could cause policymakers to act in a non-benevolent
manner. Rejecting the then common benevolent-planner approach, Gaus (1947) situates
policymakers within an ecological system. Gaus asserts and illustrates the effect of various

3

factors (people, place, physical technology, social technology, wishes and ideas, catastrophe, and
personality) on administrative decision making. Examining physical technology, Gaus finds
suboptimal policy to be the result of jockeying between “automobile users, hotel proprietors,
road builders” and “carriage and harness makers,” resulting in bureaucratic infighting over
taxation and jurisdiction.
Long (1949) then identifies the exact linkage by which competition between interests
highlighted a rational reason for agencies to deviate from their established purpose: power.
Central to this claim is the assertion that “[t]he lifeblood of administration is power,” leading to
the necessary corollary that administrative bodies are primarily concerned with “[i]ts attainment,
maintenance, increase, dissipation, and loss.” He considers the hypothetical counterfactual
comparing two agencies, both created by identical statutes. The difference being that the first
was “wrung from an amorphous and unstable combination of consumer and labor groups,” while
the second was “backed by the disciplined organizations of farmers and their Congressmen.”
Even though, they would have the same “legal authority to act,” the latter would be far more
successful, as it would have power (specifically the power that comes from “public legitimacy”).
In other words, benevolent agencies, in their quest to carry out their mission, must keep an eye to
maximizing their power.
Stigler (1971) is the first to suggest an economic theory of capture. His fundamental
hypothesis is that “as a rule, regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and operated
primarily for its benefit.” The level will be determined by the intersection of the (industry)
demand curve for regulation and the (politician's) supply of regulation. He asserts that two
fundamental characteristics of the special interest would determine its demand. First, he asserts
that larger groups would have more difficulty acquiring regulation. The larger group size creates
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a collective-action problem: in larger groups, each member's contribution to the collective
lobbying effort, matter less. Hence, the temptation in larger groups is for an individual
beneficiary to evade their individual contribution. This could be offset by the stakes for
beneficiaries – large stakes incentivizes action by members. On the supply side, he starts with the
proposition that regulation is supplied by politicians seeking to maximize their power, which is
dependent on money and votes. Money from special interests would motivate politicians to
supply regulation, while those on the losing end of the proposed regulation would cost the
politician votes. He, however, discounts this factor by arguing that most voters would be only
marginally affected by the new regulation, and would therefore have little incentive to consider
the regulation in their voting decisions.
Peltzman (1976) advances upon this theory by finding competition between interests
implied that no single interest could capture a regulatory body. For Peltzman, a politician's goal
is to maximize their majority (determined by money and votes), which cannot occur when a
politician offers complete producer protection – insofar as consumers possess the ability to offer
a few votes or a small monetary contribution, the majority maximizing politician will depart
from the cartel equilibrium. Due to organization and information costs, it is unlikely that a small
deviation would result in complete withdrawal of producer support in the event of a deviation
from complete producer protection. On the other hand, Peltzman's consumers are stronger than
Stigler's as he accurately recognizes that subgroups of consumers can organize to provide the
appropriate political benefit for consumer protection. In effect, the regulator will choose the
bundle of rents that best maximizing his or her majority given the differing payoffs that the
various interested parties are able to offer, resulting in an optimal bundle entailing neither
complete consumer, nor complete producer protection.
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Becker (1983) provides a subsequent major advancement to the model: deadweight losses
as a constraint on inefficient regulatory policies. Using a model similar to Peltzman (two
competing interests vying for a regulator's favor), he introduces deadweight losses (technically,
the difference between the heights of the supply and demand function, but functionally
equivalent to the winner's gain minus the loser's loss from the regulatory change). The further the
regulator moves from the optimum, the smaller the marginal gain for the winner, and the larger
the marginal loss for the loser. The extra effect of a dollar's gain (in allowing the winner to
influence the politician) creates increasing pressure from the losers to escape the escalating
losses. Hence, an equilibrium can have some deadweight loss (i.e., some capture), but it will be
bounded.
Additional literature focuses on complicating the model. The first subset of this literature
works to introduce the additional actors, as well as private information to capture theory. Tirole
(1986) separates the government from the regulator, leaving three actors: the government, the
regulator and the firm. Regulating a monopolist with unknown costs (i.e., private information),
leaves the regulator to propose a contract that attempts to limit the benefits to the monopoly, but
one that will leave rents in cases where costs are lower than what regulators believe them to be.
Laffont and Tirole (1993) then use the separation between the government and regulators to
propose a model that would provide regulators with an incentive to be captured. Taking Tirole's
model, they note that, often, due to the expertise of the regulator, they are able to overcome the
information asymmetry to find out the true costs of the firm. If this happens, regulators ought to
tell the government the true cost, such that they can write a contract that efficiently regulates the
monopoly. The incentive for firms is then to bribe the regulator into feigning ignorance of the
firms' true costs, leading them to provide the government with the previously postulated second-
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best contract, thereby leaving rents for the firms to capture.
Separating the government from the regulator also allows for models wherein
Congressional (oversight) action acts to modulate regulatory activity. Using comparative statics,
Weingast and Moran (1983) find that Federal Trade Commission behavior from 1964 onwards
was significantly driven by Congressional behavior (and composition). If composition matters,
then this suggests that firms spend to secure allies on Congressional Committees. Indeed, Snyder
(1990) finds evidence that spending in open legislative races is used to purchase favors. Poole,
Romer, and Rosenthal (1987) find that spending on incumbents may be directed at securing the
incumbency of legislative allies.
Later authors have also introduced additional incentives that might tempt regulators to
provide firms some protection. Hilton (1972), recognizes that regulators will attempt to prevent
regulators from "squawking." Firms who are dissatisfied with their regulators might very well
spread negative rumors or information about the competence of the regulator, thereby damaging
either the specific regulator or the agency. Leaver (2009) uses a model wherein regulators cannot
guarantee that their decisions will not unnecessarily hurt firms. In this instance, when the firms
are hurt by a regulatory mistake, they will squawk, and as regulators are not perfect, the
complaint could gain traction). If regulators are concerned about their reputations (and believe
that the squawking could impact it negatively), they will be generous to noisy firms – even if
they are certain that harsher treatment is in order. Hence, generous policies (even if mistaken)
will not draw complaints, while tough policies (even if optimal) will draw leniency. Dal Bó, et
al. (2006) add bribes to this setup, finding that (relative to the counterfactual where firms cannot
exert coercive pressure, leading to lower payoffs to regulators) the ability to apply coercive
pressure to regulators will decrease competence.
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Finally, there are attempts to introduce further consumer pressure into the model.
Holburn and Spiller (2002) study the aftermath of the oil shocks of the 1970s. Specifically, they
examine the creation of independent consumer advocates as a method to keep consumer interest
in mind. They find that these consumer advocates help decrease the price of electricity. There is
mixed evidence suggesting that elected officials are less prone to capture by industry. Hagerman
and Ratchford (1978) investigate whether the method of regulator selection (e.g., election or
appointment) makes a difference in allowed margin, and find no evidence that the method of
appointment influences allowed margins. Boyes and McDowell (1989) find that legislators are
responsive to consumers, as states that require legislative approval of commission rates have
lower electricity costs. Besley and Coate (2003) look at pricing (of fossil fuels), rather than
margins, and find a result to the contrary, namely that elected commissioners do, in fact, protect
consumers, Fields et al. (1997) examine the insurance market using Proposition 103 (in
California), which placed approval of property and casualty rates in the hands of an elected
insurance commission. Using an event study, they find that Proposition 103 did reduce rates –
although this could have also been due to uncertainty.
While models examining an individual regulator provide a basic structural framework,
they do not adequately reflect the fact that most regulated industries must pressure a body of
individuals. Denzau and Munger (1986) examine the decision-making process of legislators who
face rewards (e.g., campaign contributions) from special interests and punishment (e.g.,
withholding of votes) by consumers for selling out. Given the variability in constituencies,
legislators will have varying prices. The firms will then attempt to assemble a majority of
minimum-cost legislators. Snyder (1991) proposes a model wherein a firm targets the legislators
that are neither friendly (already likely to vote for the firm's project) nor unfriendly (too
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expensive). In other words, firms target legislators that are on the fence. Hence, firms will
minimize their requests to lower costs. In addition, they will find larger legislatures more
expensive as they will need to bribe blocks rather than single legislators. Neeman (1999) injects
uncertainty regarding the value of a vote into the model, finding that votes in large legislatures
will be cheaper as legislators will attach a smaller probability to their vote being pivotal.
Economists and political scientists have both speculated that campaign contributions by
firms could also have an effect on capture. The empirical evidence on this question is
unfortunately scarce. De Figueiredo and Edwards (2007) examine the effect of legislative
campaign contributions on the price that extant firms are allowed to charge (to entrants for use of
their infrastructure), finding that contributions do raise this price. In the literature on trade,
Hansen and Park (1995) examine complaints to the international trade administration finding that
complaints are more likely to be successful when firm Political Action Committees (PACs)
donate to members on the committees responsible for overseeing trade. Eicher and Osang (2002)
find more non-tariff protection when PAC contributions to legislators are higher. Gordon and
Hafer (2005) provide a mechanism by which firm political spending would affect regulatory
action. Specifically, they examine the idea that spending might be a signaling mechanism (put
another way, an attempt to flex their muscles at bureaucrats). Examining the number of hours
spent by regulators at nuclear plants, they find that while large donors (controlling for spending,
those with high PAC contributions to and on behalf of candidates) are less compliant, they are
also monitored less. They also find qualified support for the hypothesis that firms with publicly
observable problems decrease their political expenditures. Gordon and Hafer (2007) find a
Bayesian equilibrium, wherein firms spend for two reasons: (1) once a mandate is in place, they
will use the magnitude of their contributions to deter enforcement and (2) the allocation of their
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contributions to encourage legislatures to weaken the mandate.
II. Empirical Framework
The primary goal of this paper is to determine if contributions are (positively) related to
regulatory capture. Historically, capture has been necessarily difficult to distill into a single
variable. State-by-state comparisons of the presence of capture necessarily examine rulemaking,
rather than outcomes. Examinations of pricing are useful for determining the degree of capture,
but again do not give rise to broader insights on regulatory outcomes. As such this paper
attempts to examine both the pattern and various outcomes of inspections to determine the
presence of capture. While not determinative, the specific outcome variable where capture is
recorded could potentially suggest the mechanism by which capture occurs. To help distill
capture into a variable, this paper will focus on answering the following research questions:
(1) Do inspectors use their discretion to reduce random inspections to contributors?
(2) Do inspectors use their discretion to give out lesser violations to contributors, thereby
preempting otherwise required inspections associated with higher penalties?
(3) For inspections of the same character, does the MSHA conduct less thorough
inspections for contributors?
(4) Are negative inspection outcomes reduced for contributors?
(5) Do inspectors use their discretion to preempt higher penalties for contributors by
lessening penalty determinants?
(6) Does the MSHA minimize squawking by strong firms through reducing penalties for
contributor firms that choose to contest their penalty?
These six research questions have been formulated into empirically testable variables
through the following models:
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In the above models, there are the following control variables:
X is a vector of control variables representing the inherent hazard level of the mine – a
factor that would likely influence the number of inspections.
Y represents the influence of miners (i.e. if they have a safety committee). This helps
account for factors that have the potential to offset capture.
Z is a vector of variables representing the difficulty of conducting an inspection, which
ought to be germane to the length and intensity of any inspection that takes place.
The first model is estimated using mine fixed effects and dummy variables for the cycle are
excluded. All other models account for cycle specific fixed effects using such dummy variables.
The first model measures whether the number of spot inspections (in a given election
cycle for a given mine) is a function of contributions and having a Republican Congressman with
control variables for the inherent safety risks of the mine and miner influence. The second model
measures whether the intensity of an inspection for a mine is a function of contributions and
having a Republican Congressman, with control variables for difficulty of inspection and miner
influence. The third model measures whether a given penalty factor is a function of contributions
and having a Republican Congressman. Given that these models do not present capture as a
single outcome, but rather the result of a variety of choices by inspectors, for each equation there
is more than one possible outcome variable.
The first equation measures the effect of contributions on the pattern of discretionary
inspections, holding certain factors constant. The first outcome variable examined is spot
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inspections writ large. Thus, the first outcome measures whether contributions drive inspections
of all spot types (excluding 103(g) and 103(i)).1 The second outcome variable measured is spot
inspections. That is, the second outcome measures whether contributions drive general spot
inspections (those flagged in activity reports as “Spot Inspection”).2 The third outcome variable
measured is Office Generated Violation Activity. This measures whether contributions decreases
the issuance of violations that require follow-up inspections. In other words, this outcome tests
whether contributions encourage inspectors to utilize their discretion by granting fewer
violations that require follow-up inspections. The final outcome measures whether contributions
drive the number of inspections conducted (granted) under Section 101 Petitions. Section 101
Petitions are petitions to “modify the application of any mandatory safety standard.” As such
they lower the compliance burden placed on firms, and it is, therefore, in a firm’s interest to be
granted such a petition.
The second equation measures the effect of contributions on the intensity of standard
inspections. Quality variables tested are the portion of the inspection spent onsite, the number of
inspectors sent to the site, the amount of time spent inspecting. Inspection outcome variables
tested include the number of violations and the total penalty cost of those violations.
The third equation measures the factors that cause higher penalties3 and whether

1

Section 103(g) spot inspections are inspections made in response to credible complaints by miners or
representatives of miners. While certainly discretionary, they are not on expectation random. Further, they are
dependent on the presence of a complaint, which this dataset cannot control for, hence their exclusion. Section
103(i) spot inspections are inspections conducted on a mandated interval following the discovery of a known hazard.
As a result there is no room for discretion – if inspectors find methane above certain levels, they must spot inspect
once every X days until the hazard has been abated. Without discretionary status, these spot inspections are also
excluded.
2
Spot Inspections exclude spot inspections that are limited in scope (e.g., electrical spot inspections, impoundment
spot inspections), thereby including only spot inspections whose purpose is to ascertain the general condition of the
mine.
3
MSHA Penalties are calculated on a points basis. Various factors (e.g. appropriateness of the penalty to the size of
the business of the operator charged, Repeat Violations Per Inspection Day) accrue points as per a pre-defined
schedule. These points are converted to penalties using a table specific to the infraction (i.e. 88 points for an
unwarrantable failure citation would accrue a higher fine than 88 points for a flagrant violation citation). This paper
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challenges lower those penalties.
III. Description of Data
I rely upon two data sets for analysis. The first consists of the records of the Mines Safety
and Health Administration (MSHA). Mining data are strong choice for a number of reasons.
Firstly, the mines industry produces a large sample size – it is one of the most regulated with
some records reaching back to the formation of the agency in 1978. More importantly, the
mining regulatory framework includes a number of avenues for inspector discretion, allowing for
investigation of multiple potential dimensions for capture. This data set includes inspection
records of mine geography, inspections and violations issued, and operator submitted data on
accidents.
This paper’s first regression is run at the mine level. While there are more than 30 types
of inspections conducted, I choose to focus on those where discretion is most likely – with each
option yielding important implications on the potential mechanism for capture. Spot inspections
are the ultimate discretionary tool; it is possible to imagine inspectors harassing companies
through a glut of inspections. Section 101 petitions loosen safety requirements and do not have a
definitive, prescribed test. Accordingly, the granting of a Section 101 inspection leaves
significant room for discretion. It is also possible that inspectors use their discretion to preempt
future inspections. If this is the case I expect to find fewer inspections as a result of Office
Generated Violation Activity, i.e., inspections that are mandatory after the finding of certain
violations. There are a number of mine level control variables that may be included to represent
the inherent risks present at the mine. These variables include the mine type (both output and
facility), mine height, the number of producing pits, the use of advanced surface mining

tests whether inspectors use discretion to assign lower levels of negligence, severity, likelihood and/or persons
potentially affected).
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techniques (highwall), and total hours of production. Due to limitations in the data set, these
variables can only be tracked as of the last filing – that is for this paper’s model they cannot vary
over time, although as most of them are fairly constant characteristics (e.g. mine height) they do
not. Fortunately, total production hours can be tracked across cycles; however, it is tracked by
calendar year, rather than the electoral calendar.
The second set of regressions is run at the inspection level. Again there are many
opportunities for discretion, leading to multiple outcome variables. The true outcome variable
that I would like to track is the proportion of all violations detected and addressed. Of course, it
is simply impossible to do so. The best proxy that can be used are measures of effort, including
number of staff, time spent by staff, and quality of time spent. At this level, relevant control
variables relate to the geography of the inspection, including the geography of the mine, as well
as what portions of the mine were inspected.
At the violations level, penalty determinants and (for contested penalties) changes in
penalties provide reasonable room for discretion. In particular, the latter allows us to test the
concept of bureaucratic squawk minimal behavior, wherein regulators show preferential
treatment to firms that complain – and especially preferential treatment for influential firms (i.e.,
large political donors) that squawk.
Political contributions data must be recorded with federal agencies – using data coded by
Open Secrets and the Center for Responsible Politics, I was able to generate a variable for
importance of mining contributions by Congressional District. Specifically, I was able to
aggregate contributions from the coal mining industry and measure them as a percent of all
contributions in a given Congressional District. While this does not track all potential corporate
expenditures (indeed, given the rise of the current system of nonprofit-SuperPAC coordination, it
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would likely be impossible to do so), it is likely that donations by individuals reflect preferences
similar to the consumption of corporations. Future revisions of this paper will examine PAC and
other forms of corporate spending. It is difficult to match specific contributions to specific mines
without uncovering all corporate entities; however, future revisions will attempt this procedure to
provide additional focus. Of the 435 Congressional Districts in the United States, over the 5
electoral cycles measured, on average, 84 contained at least one mine. The mean coal
contribution was quite small at 0.1% of total contributions; however, in the maximum
contribution was much higher, peaking at 14.8% in 2004. Additional summary statistics are
presented in Table 2.
Summary statistics for outcome variables are reported in Table 3, with summary statistics
for control variables reported in Table 4.
IV. Results
As a preface to regression results, I return to the research questions previously posited.
Further analysis will be presented subsections I–III. Outcomes were partially consistent with
respect to the expectations contained in the previously-mentioned research questions:
Do inspectors use their discretion to reduce random inspections to contributors? With the
caveat that regressions seeking to address this question had extremely low explanatory power,
there is no evidence to suggest that inspectors use their discretion in this manner.
Do inspectors use their discretion to give out lesser violations to contributors, thereby
preempting otherwise required inspections associated with higher penalties? Again with the
caveat that these regressions had low explanatory power, there is evidence to suggest that
contributors experience fewer inspections that are the result of required follow-ups after
citations.
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For inspections of the same character, does the MSHA conduct less thorough inspections
for contributors? Yes, for regular inspections, the MSHA sends fewer personnel, each of whom
spends less time inspecting with more of their inspection spent offsite.
Are negative inspection outcomes reduced for contributors? No. On the contrary, the
violation per inspection count is actually higher for contributors.
Do inspectors use their discretion to preempt higher penalties for contributors by
lessening penalty determinants? Somewhat. While there is no systematic movement by
inspectors to grant low negligence or low likelihood, there is an association between
contributions and moderate negligence. Determinations of high negligence and high likelihood
are also lower for contributors. Findings of no lost days are also higher for contributors.
Similarly, estimates of the number affected are lower for contributors.
Does the MSHA minimize squawking by strong firms through reducing penalties for
contributors that choose to contest their penalty? No. While penalties are on average reduced for
firms that contest, penalties are increased for contributors that contest their penalties.
IV.I. Pattern of Random Inspections
For each of the four outcome variables, results are estimated under three specifications.
The first of these examines exclusively the effect of the contributions-percentage by district. This
specification has little explanatory power in any of the regressions (the highest R-squared across
the four outcome variables for this specification was 0.0144).
For Spot Type and Spot Inspections, contributions are positively related to the number of
inspections. This is contrary to the expectation that contributions would purchase fewer random
inspections. It is likely that this is a result of district-specific fixed effects. A number of
contributor districts contain not one, but thousands of mines. With a high concentration of mines
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in the area, it is likely that (a) miners have more influence on regulators and (2) that these offices
are more active in conducting inspections. The finding that contributor districts have higher
levels of spot inspections, then does not preempt stratification within those districts such that
even though the district as a whole has higher inspection activity, contributor firms within these
districts would see lower spot inspection activity. Further revisions will focus on testing such a
hypothesis.
For inspections that result from previous findings of violations (i.e. Office Generated
Violations Activity) there is a negative association with contributions. This suggests that
discretion for contributors comes in the form of preempting future inspections by preempting the
harshest violations. For the final variable, Section 101 Petition Inspections there is also evidence
to suggest capture – this initial regression reveals a positive correlation between contributions
and Section 101 Petition Inspections. Contributor firms ought to favor such inspections, as they
are intended to weaken safety standards.
The next specification introduces variables controlling for the party affiliation of the
District’s Congressman and the size of the mine. Having a Republican Congressman is correlated
with a decrease in the number of Spot Type Inspections by 0.593 inspections per cycle, where
this model explains 13.66% of the variation between panels. It is also correlated with a decrease
in the number of Spot Inspections by 0.354 inspections per cycle, where this model explains only
6.49% of variation between mines. This suggests that Republican Congressmen (due to ideology)
discourage vigorous inspections in their district. For both Spot Type Inspections and Spot
Inspections, higher cycle production is negatively associated with inspections per cycle, while
higher cycle employment hours are positively associated with inspections per cycle. This is
consistent with the mandate of inspectors to reduce the human costs (e.g., injury, death)
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associated with mining, while maximizing production.
With this specification explaining 6.72% of variance between panels, Republican
Congressmen are correlated with an increase of 0.062 Office Generated Violation Activity
Inspections per cycle. This minimal effect and counterintuitive effect is again likely a result of
district-level fixed effects. Due to omitted variable bias, the direction of the coefficients on
production and employment hours are not accurate in this specification and will be reported in
the next specification.
This specification explains 11.22% of the variance in Section 101 Petition Inspections.
Here the coefficient on Republican Congressmen is not significant. Again higher cycle
production is negatively associated with inspections per cycle, while higher cycle employment
hours is positively associated with inspections per cycle.
The final specification introduces mine geography variables and miners’ influence
variables. Each additional percentage point in contributions increases the number of Spot Type
Inspections by 0.144 inspections per cycle, where this model explains 24.82% of the variation
between panels. Each additional percentage point in contributions also increases the number of
Spot Inspections by 0.05 inspections per cycle, where this model explains 13.90% of the
variation between panels. As previously reported, this is likely the effect of district-level fixed
effects.
Contributions again has a correlation with Office Generated Violations activity with an
decrease of 0.03 inspections per cycle for each additional percentage point in contributions,
where this model explains 9.00% of the variation between panels. Higher cycle production is
negatively correlated with these inspections, while higher cycle employment is positively
correlated with inspections, which again points to the dual nature of the MSHA mandate.
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Contributions are positively associated with Section 101 Petition Inspections, with an
increase of 0.003 of inspections per percentage point in contributions, where this model explains
14.49% of variation between panels.
Full results can be found in Tables 5–8.
IV.II. Nature of Standard Inspections
Estimates of the intensity of inspection are also run for several outcome variables with
each outcome variable representing a proxy for capturable outcome. This analysis relies on a
dataset that has been pared to include only Regular Safety and Health Inspections, as these ought
to – conditional on inspection geography – be similar in nature. There is evidence to support the
proposition that inspectors conduct shoddier inspections for contributors: While not statistically
significant, contributions are associated with fewer inspectors sent to these Regular Inspections.
Inspection time is lower for contributors: Each additional percentage point in contributions
(conditional on number of inspectors) is associated with 0.64 fewer hours spent inspecting,
where this model explains 82.7% of the variation. However, of these inspection hours, more are
spent on-site: Each additional percentage point in contributions is associated with 0.187% more
hours spent on-site, where this model explains 21.2% of variation. Again, this is likely due to
district-level fixed effects.
Perversely, then, there is evidence positively correlating contributions with violations
issued per inspection – each additional percentage point in contributions is associated with 0.17
more violations, where this model explains 51.5% of variation. In part, this ought to be due to the
percentage of time spent on-site – even though inspectors are spending less time inspecting,
more of it is spent inspecting the mine, rather than examining records or writing inspection
reports. Further, this is likely due to district-level fixed effects, wherein more vigorous MSHA
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offices are located in high-contributor districts, leading to higher inspection activity and
citations, but allowing for the possibility of stratification once controlling for this effect. In large
part due to the number of violations, each additional percentage point in contributions is
correlated with an additional $167.53 in penalties, where this model explains 19.0% of variation.
While not statistically significant, controlling for the number of citations, leads to a negative
association between contributions and penalty size.
Full results can be found in Tables 9–10.
IV.III. Penalties
Many of the determinants of penalties are categorical, rather than numerical. For these
categories, I compare the linear probability of the possible findings, looking for evidence to
suggest a positive systematic variance between contributions and findings of lower and more
moderate categories, and a negative systematic variance between contributions and findings of
higher categories. There is some evidence to suggest that while inspectors do not assign the
lowest finding to contributors, they shield them from categories associated with harsher
penalties. For negligence, there is not enough evidence to reject the finding that extreme findings
(i.e., no negligence, recklessness) are not assigned significantly more or less to contributors;
however, in regressions explaining 0.9%, 0.8% and 0.2% of variance, contributions are
associated with a higher probability of determinations of low or moderate negligence and a lower
probability of determinations of high negligence. As part of the penalty determination, inspectors
also select the likelihood of an accident. In a model explaining 0.0% of variance, contributions
are associated with a higher probability of having an accident occur. Nevertheless, in inspector
determinations, contributors are shielded – there is a higher probability that they will be assigned
a finding of reasonably likely, where the model explains 0.8% of variance. Oddly, there is a
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lower probability that they will be assigned a finding of unlikely, where the model explains 0.7%
of variance. The final categorical comparison I test is severity. Again, there is evidence to
suggest shielding – while contributors are more likely to receive findings of permanent injury or
fatal injury, they are also more likely to receive findings of no lost days (in regressions
explaining 1.2%, 0.5% and 0.7% of variation, respectively). Inspectors also assign the (likely)
number affected by an accident were it to occur. As this is not categorical, no comparison is
necessary. Each additional percentage point in contributions is associated with a determination
that 0.02 fewer people would be affected, where the model explains 0.1% of variation.
I also test the possibility that the MSHA minimizes squawking by strong firms through
reducing penalties for contributors that choose to contest their penalty. Each additional
percentage point in contributions is associated with an additional $58.62 in penalties after the
review process is complete, where this model explains 0.8% of variance. Which is to say, that
there is no evidence that the MSHA minimizes squawking for strong firms. It does, however, still
suggest capture. Administrative judges (who are better insulated from political pressure) in their
reviews of inspector determinations actually find excessive leniency toward contributors,
choosing to raise penalties on them. These findings, of course, come with the caveat that these
models have extremely low explanatory power, suggesting that penalties are best explained by
factors other than contributions.
Full results can be found in Tables 11–15. A summary of results is provided below in
Table 16.
TABLE 16. Summary of Results
Research Question
Variable
(1) Do inspectors use their
Spot Type
discretion to reduce random
Inspections
inspections to contributors?

Significance R-Square
14.40***
0.248
(Between)

Comment
Inconsistent sign
likely due to
district-level fixed
effects
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Spot
Inspections
§101

4,937***

(2) Do inspectors use their
discretion to give out lesser
violations to contributors,
thereby preempting otherwise
required inspections
associated with higher
penalties?

Office
Generated
Violation
Activity

-2.565***

(3) For inspections of the
same character, does the
MSHA conduct less thorough
inspections for contributors?

Number of
Inspectors

-0.579

0.509

Not significant;
consistent w/
capture

Total
Inspection
Time
On-Site/
Total
Hours

-64.85***

0.827

Consistent w/
capture

0.187***

0.212

Number of
Violations

17.18***

0.515

Total
Penalties

16,753***

0.190

Total
Penalties
(Constant
Violation
Count)

-2,762

0.439

Inconsistent sign
likely due to
district-level fixed
effects
Inconsistent sign
likely due to
district-level fixed
effects
Inconsistent sign
likely due to
district-level fixed
effects
Not significant;
sign consistent w/
capture

0.0708**

0.009

0.163***

0.008

-0.231***

0.002

0.0159

0.001

(4) Are negative inspection
outcomes reduced for
contributors?

(5) Do inspectors use their
discretion to preempt higher
penalties for contributors by
lessening penalty
determinants?

Low
Negligence
Moderate
Negligence
High
Negligence
Not Likely

0.289***

0.139
(Between)
0.145
(Between)
0.090
(Between)

Consistent w/
capture
Consistent w/
capture

Consistent w/
capture
Consistent w/
capture
Consistent w/
capture
Not significant;
sign consistent
w/capture
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(6) Does the MSHA minimize
squawking by strong firms
through reducing penalties for
contributor firms that choose
to contest their penalty?

Unlikely

-0.966***

0.007

Reasonably
Likely
No Lost
Days
Lost Days

0.963***

0.008

0.420***

0.012

-0.844***

0.007

Persons
Affected

-1.839***

0.001

Change in
Penalty

5,862***

0.008

Inconsistent w/
capture; likely due
to shielding from
highest penalties
rather than
complete capture
Consistent w/
capture
Consistent w/
capture
Inconsistent w/
capture; likely due
to shielding from
highest penalties
rather than
complete capture
Consistent w/
capture
Inconsistent w/
squawk
minimizing
behavior;
consistent w/
capture

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
V. Conclusions
The testing performed suggests that there is evidence that MHSA has been captured by
contributions as evident in the findings regarding interpreting systematic inspection patterns. In
the pattern of inspections, inspectors conduct fewer follow-up inspections and are more likely to
consider lowering safety standards. While conducting the inspections themselves, each inspector
spends less time inspecting. When determining penalties, inspectors are more likely to assign
contributors moderate determinations. Further, when politically insulated judges review those
moderate findings, they find that evidence of excess leniency, choosing to raise penalties. These
findings are consistent with previous research finding that regulators are corruptible. In
particular, these findings align with Gordon and Hafer (2005), whose game-theoretical modeling
23

posited contributions as a signaling mechanism and whose empirical analysis of nuclear powerplant inspections found a negative association between inspection time and contributions. They
are also consistent with Campos and Giovannoni (2007) whose cross-country empirical analysis
finds that political expenditures are highly effective in engendering capture.
To the extent that these findings are based on district-level conclusions, they present two
key limitations: (1) they do not control for district-level fixed effects and (2) they suggest a freerider problem (i.e., if district-level contributions matter more than mine-level contributions, then
there is little incentive to contribute). Future revisions ought to either account for district-level
fixed effects or match contributions to mining companies, rather than districts. A full accounting
of expenditures (rather than just contributions) could also increase accuracy.
While this research suggests capture at the MSHA, it cannot be applied generally – the
MSHA’s specific design could leave it more prone to capture. Assuming that the MSHA were an
average agency, this suggests that capture can be achieved for surprisingly little in contributions
– at an average of $1.1 million in expenditures per seat (in 2008), it would take only $11,000 to
achieve the marginal impacts described in this paper. In other words, under this assumption, it
takes only three persons donating at the statutory maximum to achieve a reasonable degree of
capture.
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APPENDIX A. Data Dictionary
TABLE 1. Data Dictionary
Variable
Type
Definition
Coal/Total Contributions Percentage Aggregate coal contributions divided by total
contributions in a Congressional District
Republican
Indicator
District has Republican Congressman
Congressman
Spot Type Inspections
Count
Count of Spot Type Inspections (all Spot Inspections
excluding 103(g) and 103(i)) in an election cycle
Spot Inspections
Count
Count of Spot Inspections in an election sycle
Office Generated
Count
Count of Office Generated Violation Activity
Violation Activity
Inspections in an election cycle
Section 101 Petition
Count
Count of Section 101 Petition Inspections in an election
cycle
Cycle Employment
Numeric
Total employment hours in the two calendar years
Hours
closest matching the election cycle
Production
Numeric
Total coal production in the two calendar years closest
matching the election cycle
Average Mine Height
Numeric
Average mining height in inches
Number of NonNumeric
Number of pits that are not producing materials at the
Producing Pits
mine location
Miles from Office
Numeric
Driving distance to the mine/mill from the office
responsible for conducting inspection.
Anthracite Coal
Indicator
Mine produces anthracite coal
Bituminous Coal
Indicator
Mine produces bituminous coal
Lignite Coal
Indicator
Mine produces lignite coal
Portable Mine
Indicator
Indicator denoting whether this is a portable mine
Highwall Miner
Indicator
Indicator denoting whether or not a mine uses a
highwall miner (surface coal only)
Safety Committee
Indicator
Indicator denoting whether there a safety committee at
the mine location
Surface Mine
Indicator
Indicator denoting whether the mine is a surface mine
Facility Mine
Indicator
Indicator denoting whether the mine is a facility mine
Underground Mine
Indicator
Indicator denoting whether the mine is an underground
mine
Number of Inspectors
Numeric
Total number of inspectors working on the inspection
Total On-Site Hours
Numeric
Total hours recorded on the Weekly Time and Activity
Data form: On-Site Inspection Time (MNM), MMU Pit
Time (C), Outby (Coal UG Mines), Surface Area Time
(C) and C/O Writing On Site (MNM, C), including Task
code S,T,O hours
Total Inspection Hours
Numeric
Total hours recorded on the Weekly Time and Activity
Data form: On-Site Inspection Time (MNM), MMU Pit
Time (C), Outby (Coal UG mines), Surface Area Time
(C), C/O Writing On Site (MNM,C), C/O Writing Off
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No. of Active Sections
Inspected
No. of Idle Sections
Inspected
No. of Shaft/Slope
Sinking Construction
Areas Inspected
No. of Impoundment
Construction Operations
Inspected
No. of Building
Construction Sites
Inspected
No. of Draglines/Shovel
Construction Operations
Inspected
No. of Other
Unclassified
Construction Sites
Inspected
Records Inspected
Surface
Area/Underground Mine
Inspected
Surface Mine/Facility
Inspected
Identified Refuse Piles
Inspected
Outby Areas Inspected
Major Construction
Operation Inspected
Shafts/Slopes Inspected
Identified
Impoundments Inspected
Explosives Storage
Inspected
Misc. Areas Inspected

Numeric

Site, Travel, Other, including Task code S,T,O
Number of active working sections inspected

Numeric

Number of idle working sections inspected

Numeric

Number of shaft/slope sinking construction areas
inspected

Numeric

Number of impoundment construction operations
inspected

Numeric

Number of building construction sites inspected

Numeric

Number of draglines/shovel construction operations
inspected

Numeric

Number of other unclassified construction areas
inspected

Indicator
Indicator

Company records inspected indicator
Surface area/underground mine inspected indicator

Indicator

Surface mine/facility inspected indicator

Indicator

Identified refuse piles inspected indicator

Indicator
Indicator

Outby areas inspected indicator
Major construction operation inspected indicator

Indicator
Indicator

Shafts/slopes inspected indicator
Identified impoundments inspected indicator

Indicator

Explosives storage inspected indicator

Indicator

No Negligence

Indicator

Low Negligence

Indicator

Moderate Negligence

Indicator

Coal areas of inspection Not Elsewhere Classified
(NEC) indicator
Indicator denoting a determination of no negligence
assigned by the inspector to the violator due to the
violation.
Indicator denoting a determination of low negligence
assigned by the inspector to the violator due to the
violation.
Indicator denoting a determination of moderate
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High Negligence

Indicator

Reckless

Indicator

Not Likely

Indicator

Unlikely

Indicator

Reasonably Likely

Indicator

Highly Likely

Indicator

Occurred

Indicator

No Lost Days

Indicator

Lost Days

Indicator

Permanent

Indicator

Fatal

Indicator

Number Affected due to
Violation

Numeric

Change in Penalty

Numeric

negligence assigned by the inspector to the violator due
to the violation.
Indicator denoting a determination of high negligence
assigned by the inspector to the violator due to the
violation.
Indicator denoting a determination of recklessness
assigned by the inspector to the violator due to the
violation.
Indicator of the seriousness of the violation being cited
as measured by the likelihood of the occurrence of an
accident as not likely
Indicator of the seriousness of the violation being cited
as measured by the likelihood of the occurrence of an
accident as unlikely
Indicator of the seriousness of the violation being cited
as measured by the likelihood of the occurrence of an
accident as not likely
Indicator of the seriousness of the violation being cited
as measured by the likelihood of the occurrence of an
accident as highly likely
Indicator of the seriousness of the violation being cited
as measured by the likelihood of the occurrence of an
accident as occurred
Indicator of seriousness of violation being cited as
measured by severity of the injury or illness to persons
if accident were to occur due to the conditions of the
violation as no lost days
Indicator of seriousness of violation being cited as
measured by severity of the injury or illness to persons
if accident were to occur due to the conditions of the
violation as lost days
Indicator of seriousness of violation being cited as
measured by severity of the injury or illness to persons
if accident were to occur due to the conditions of the
violation as permanent injuries
Indicator of seriousness of violation being cited as
measured by severity of the injury or illness to persons
if accident were to occur due to the conditions of the
violation as no fatal
Measure of the number of persons affected or
potentially affected by the conditions at the Mine due to
the violation
Final assessed penalty less proposed penalty
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APPENDIX B. Summary Statistics
TABLE 2. Summary Statistics for Primary Explanatory Variable of Interest
Variable
2002 2004 2006 2008
Number of Congressional Districts
435
435
435
435
Number of Congressional Districts with at Least One
82
79
115
71
Mine
Number of Congressional Districts with More than One
68
62
87
48
Mine
Mean Contribution
0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002
Standard Deviation
0.007 0.009 0.008 0.006
Minimum Contribution
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Maximum Contribution
0.104 0.148 0.112 0.064

2010
435
73
49
0.001
0.006
0.000
0.058
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TABLE 3.

Summary Statistics for Response Variables of Interest
Response
Standard
Type
Sub-Type
Variable
Mean
Deviation
Patterns of
Spot Type
2.592
3.856
Discretionary
n = 8,292
Inspections
Spot Inspections
1.888
3.140
n = 8,292
Office Generated
Violation
0.269
0.446
Activity
n = 8,292
Section 101
Petition
0.042
0.296
Inspection
n = 8,292
Standard
Quality
Inspection Spent
Inspection
On-Site
0.615
0.140
n = 59,988
Number of
Inspectors
2.282
2.291
n = 54,381
Total Inspection
Hours
101.881
167.047
n = 54,381
Outcome
Number of
Violations Issued
8.169
18.834
n = 122,123
Aggregate Value
of Penalties
5,606.361 41,662.890
Proposed
n =122,123
Penalties
Negligence
No
0.002
0.042
Assessed with
n = 761,238
Violation
Low
0.097
0.296
n = 761,238
Moderate
0.861
0.346
n = 761,238
High
0.040
0.195
n = 761,238
Reckless
0.001
0.034
n = 761,238
Likelihood
No Likelihood
0.026
0.161
n = 761,228
Unlikely
0.602
0.489
n = 761,228
Reasonably
Likely
0.360
0.480
n = 761,228
Highly Likely
0.008
0.091
n = 761,228
Occurred
0.002
0.050
n = 761,228
Severity
No Lost Days
0.168
0.374
n = 761,227
Lost Days
0.683
0.465
n = 761,227

Minimum

Maximum

0.000

62.000

0.000

62.000

0.000

3.000

0.000

6.000

0.031

1.000

0.000

33.000

0.000

3337.250

0.000

701.000

0.000

9,228,521.000

0.000

1.000

0.000

1.000

0.000

1.000

0.000

1.000

0.000

1.000

0.000

1.000

0.000

1.000

0.000

1.000

0.000

1.000

0.000

1.000

0.000

1.000

0.000

1.000
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Number
Affected
Change in
Penalty

Permanent
n = 761,227
Fatal
n = 761,227
Persons Affected
n = 777,793
Penalty Due Less
Proposed Penalty
n = 754,978

0.096

0.295

0.000

1.000

0.052

0.222

0.000

1.000

1.974

9.209

0.000

999.000

-123.187

1,628.456

-220,000.000

104,600.000
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TABLE 4.
Type
Mine-Level
Control
Variables

InspectionLevel Control
Variables
(Limited to
Regular
Inspections)

Summary Statistics for Control Variables
Control Variable
Average Mine Height
n = 15,103
Number of NonProducing Pits
n = 13,628
Miles from Office
n = 34,977
Anthracite Coal
n = 34,977
Bituminous Coal
n = 34,977
Lignite Coal
n = 34,977
Portable Mine
n = 34,977
Highwall Mining
n = 34,977
Facility Mine
n = 34,973
Surface Mine
n = 34,973
Underground Mine
n = 34,973
Safety Committee
n = 34,977
Production
n = 11,772
Employment
n = 11,772
No. of Active
Sections Inspected
n = 54,381
No. of Idle Sections
Inspected
n = 54,381
No. of Shaft/Slope
Sinking Construction
Areas Inspected
n = 54,381
No. of Impoundment
Construction
Operations Inspected
n = 54,381
No. of Building
Construction Sites
Inspected
n = 54,381
No. of
Draglines/Shovel
Construction
Operations Inspected
n = 54,381
No. of Other

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Minimum

Maximum

48.364

111.979

0.000

9,998.000

0.227

0.516

0.000

12.000

1.993

10.008

0.000

340.000

0.043

0.202

0.000

1.000

0.947

0.224

0.000

1.000

0.004

0.062

0.000

1.000

0.013

0.115

0.000

1.000

0.005

0.071

0.000

1.000

0.096

0.295

0.000

1.000

0.488

0.500

0.000

1.000

0.416

0.493

0.000

1.000

0.056

0.229

0.000

1.000

949,686.600

6,290,154.000

0.000

204,000,000.000

153,492.100

357,930.900

1.000

6,019,235.000

1.096

1.952

0.000

99.000

0.097

0.490

0.000

52.000

0.006

0.092

0.000

4.000

0.002

0.044

0.000

2.000

0.003

0.064

0.000

3.000

0.003

0.080

0.000

5.000

0.014

0.173

0.000

10.000
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Unclassified
Construction Sites
Inspected
n = 54,381
Records Inspected
n = 54,381
Surface
Area/Underground
Mine Inspected
n = 54,381
Surface Mine/Facility
Inspected
n = 54,381
Identified Refuse
Piles Inspected
n = 54,381
Outby Areas
Inspected
n = 54,381
Major Construction
Operation Inspected
n = 54,381
Shafts/Slopes
Inspected
n = 54,381
Identified
Impoundments
Inspected
n = 54,381
Explosives Storage
Inspected
n = 54,381
Misc. Areas Inspected
n = 54,381
ViolationLevel Control
Variables

2002 Cycle
n = 777,793
2004 Cycle
n = 777,793
2006 Cycle
n = 777,793
2008 Cycle
n = 777,793
2010 Cycle
n = 777,793
Contested
n = 777,793

0.878

0.328

0.000

1.000

0.538

0.499

0.000

1.000

0.478

0.499

0.000

1.000

0.087

0.282

0.000

1.000

0.388

0.487

0.000

1.000

0.019

0.138

0.000

1.000

0.046

0.209

0.000

1.000

0.087

0.282

0.000

1.000

0.235

0.424

0.000

1.000

0.039

0.193

0.000

1.000

0.160

0.367

0.000

1.000

0.151

0.358

0.000

1.000

0.189

0.391

0.000

1.000

0.241

0.427

0.000

1.000

0.260

0.439

0.000

1.000

0.162

0.369

0.000

1.000
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APPENDIX C. Main Estimates
TABLE 5. Spot Type Inspection Estimates
VARIABLES
Spot Type Spot Type
Coal/Total Contributions

Spot Type

13.78***
(1.728)

17.64***
14.40***
(1.601)
(1.538)
Republican Congressman
-0.593***
-0.497***
(0.102)
(0.0982)
Cycle Employment Hours
3.24e-06*** 2.71e-06***
(5.23e-07)
(5.33e-07)
Cycle Production
-6.30e-08*** -4.39e-08**
(1.84e-08)
(1.77e-08)
Average Mine Height
0.000125***
(4.79e-05)
Number of Non-Producing Pits
-0.00882
(0.0605)
Miles from Office
-0.00927***
(0.00191)
Anthracite Coal
0.137
(0.365)
Bituminous Coal
0.854**
(0.339)
Portable Mine
-0.315**
(0.156)
Highwall Mining
0.569***
(0.153)
Safety Committee
0.197
(0.216)
Surface Mine
-1.869***
(0.105)
Facility Mine
-1.871***
(0.236)
Constant
2.157***
1.937***
2.471***
(0.0728)
(0.106)
(0.383)
Observations
8,107
8,107
Number of Mines
2,904
2,904
R-squared
Within
0.0041
0.0108
Between
0.0171
0.1366
Overall
0.0144
0.0956
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

8,107
2,904
0.0109
0.2482
0.1588
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TABLE 6. Spot Inspection Estimates
VARIABLES
Spot Inspections Spot Inspections Spot Inspections
Coal/Total Contributions

5.071***
(1.269)

7.293***
(1.154)
-0.354***
(0.0840)
2.20e-06***
(4.79e-07)
-3.92e-08**
(1.83e-08)

1.732***
(0.0618)

1.553***
(0.0925)

4.937***
(1.160)
-0.300***
(0.0824)
1.90e-06***
(4.94e-07)
-2.69e-08
(1.77e-08)
0.000170***
(3.98e-05)
-0.0106
(0.0416)
-0.00686***
(0.00171)
0.512*
(0.303)
0.787***
(0.261)
-0.0898
(0.160)
0.629***
(0.148)
-0.0423
(0.195)
-1.146***
(0.0922)
-1.451***
(0.159)
1.637***
(0.308)

8,107
2,904

8,107
2,904

8,107
2,904

0.0001
0.0213
0.0042
0.0649
0.0035
0.0514
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

0.0228
0.1390
0.0885

Republican Congressman
Cycle Employment Hours
Production
Average Mine Height
Number of Non-Producing Pits
Miles from Office
Anthracite Coal
Bituminous Coal
Portable Mine
Highwall Miner
Safety Committee
Surface Mine
Facility Mine
Constant
Observations
Number of Mines
R-squared
Within
Between
Overall
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TABLE 7. Office Generated Violation Activity Inspection Estimates
VARIABLES
OGVA
OGVA
OGVA
Coal/Total Contributions

-2.403***
-2.565***
(0.155)
(0.160)
Republican Congressman
0.0615***
0.0604***
(0.00615)
(0.00618)
Cycle Employment Hours
-6.55e-08*** -5.33e-08***
(8.97e-09)
(9.20e-09)
Production
-1.00e-10
7.35e-11
(4.65e-10)
(3.58e-10)
Average Mine Height
-2.02e-05***
(6.65e-06)
Number of Non-Producing Pits
-0.00505
(0.00346)
Miles from Office
-0.000545***
(0.000108)
Anthracite Coal
0.0699***
(0.0191)
Bituminous Coal
0.0630***
(0.0143)
Portable Mine
0.0700***
(0.0120)
Highwall Miner
0.0459***
(0.0174)
Safety Committee
-0.0317***
(0.00831)
Surface Mine
-0.0314***
(0.00639)
Facility Mine
-0.0537***
(0.0149)
Constant
0.328***
0.314***
0.280***
(0.00519)
(0.00584)
(0.0157)
Observations
Number of Mines
R-squared
Within
Between
Overall

-2.142***
(0.148)

8,107
2,904

8,107
2,904

0.0242
0.0266
0.0353
0.0672
0.0175
0.0253
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

8,107
2,904
0.0267
0.0900
0.0308
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TABLE 8. Section 101 Petition Inspection Estimates
VARIABLES
§101
§101
Coal/Total Contributions

§101

0.470***
0.289**
(0.138)
(0.140)
Republican Congressman
0.00264
0.0148**
(0.00692)
(0.00720)
Cycle Employment Hours
1.55e-07*** 1.27e-07***
(2.34e-08)
(2.34e-08)
Production
-3.78e-09*** -2.91e-09***
(6.09e-10)
(5.62e-10)
Average Mine Height
7.10e-07
(2.00e-06)
Number of Non-Producing Pits
-0.00901***
(0.00260)
Miles from Office
0.000113
(0.000112)
Anthracite Coal
0.0687***
(0.0260)
Bituminous Coal
0.0282
(0.0205)
Portable Mine
0.00738*
(0.00431)
Highwall Miner
-0.00253
(0.00633)
Safety Committee
0.0459**
(0.0212)
Surface Mine
-0.0718***
(0.00774)
Facility Mine
-0.0748***
(0.00840)
Constant
0.0300***
0.00273
0.0119
(0.00553)
(0.00597)
(0.0217)
Observations
Number of Mines
R-squared
Within
Between
Overall

0.380***
(0.143)

8,107
2,904

8,107
2,904

0.0026
0.0081
0.0017
0.1122
0.0013
0.0283
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

8,107
2,904
0.0097
0.1449
0.0467
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TABLE 9.

Standard Inspection Quality Estimates
On-Site/
Number of
VARIABLES
Total
Inspectors
Coal/Total Contributions
Number of Inspectors
No. of Active Sections Inspected
No. of Idle Sections Inspected
No. of Shaft/Slope Sinking
Construction Areas Inspected
No. of Impoundment Construction
Operations Inspected
No. of Building Construction
Sites Inspected
No. of Draglines/Shovel Construction
Operations Inspected
No. of Other Unclassified Construction Sites Inspected
Records Inspected
Surface Area/Underground Mine
Inspected
Surface Mine/Facility Inspected
Identified Refuse Piles Inspected
Outby Areas Inspected
Major Construction Operation
Inspected
Shafts/Slopes Inspected
Identified Impoundments
Inspected
Explosives Storage Inspected
Misc. Areas Inspected
Anthracite Coal
Bituminous Coal
Surface Mine
Facility Mine
Cycle Employment Hours
Cycle Production
Miner Act Passed
Republican Congressman
2004 Cycle
2006 Cycle
2008 Cycle
2010 Cycle
Constant
Observations
R-squared

0.187***
(0.0345)
–––
0.00548***
(0.000971)
-0.0130***
(0.00318)
0.00167
(0.00780)
0.0161
(0.0128)
0.0175**
(0.00857)
-0.00889*
(0.00464)
0.0113***
(0.00333)
0.129***
(0.00385)
-0.0295***
(0.00278)
0.0113***
(0.00252)
0.00819**
(0.00411)
0.0697***
(0.00432)
-0.00433
(0.00629)
-0.0202***
(0.00450)
-0.0152***
(0.00547)
0.0297***
(0.00207)
0.0212***
(0.00364)
0.0622***
(0.0178)
0.0299*
(0.0173)
0.0403***
(0.00493)
0.0604***
(0.00545)
2.94e-08***
(4.93e-09)
-4.39e-10
(2.72e-10)
-0.00844***
(0.00271)
0.0128***
(0.00247)
0.00412**
(0.00193)
0.00300
(0.00228)
0.00475
(0.00346)
0.0256***
(0.00353)
0.401***
(0.0182)

Total Inspection Hours

-0.579
(0.481)
–––

-64.85***
(20.85)
31.62***
(1.075)
0.0141
3.976***
(0.0168)
(1.361)
-0.119***
0.571
(0.0309)
(0.786)
0.214
-0.491
(0.241)
(14.44)
1.296**
-16.72
(0.543)
(21.21)
0.257
-36.78***
(0.216)
(14.04)
-0.288*
-37.69***
(0.159)
(8.238)
0.00239
-5.572
(0.0800)
(3.484)
0.00324
1.457
(0.0292)
(1.333)
-0.138***
-5.000***
(0.0352)
(1.488)
-0.0585
1.120
(0.0402)
(1.736)
0.176**
2.730
(0.0719)
(2.761)
0.809***
39.19***
(0.0516)
(2.319)
-0.0555
20.35**
(0.152)
(8.975)
0.709***
15.47***
(0.119)
(5.202)
0.229**
-7.354**
(0.0902)
(3.684)
0.0521
0.970
(0.0347)
(1.602)
-0.0714*
3.318
(0.0396)
(2.259)
1.258***
62.26***
(0.245)
(11.34)
1.387***
52.91***
(0.238)
(10.94)
-0.586***
-9.292***
(0.0772)
(2.713)
-0.206***
-3.740
(0.0705)
(2.671)
3.61e-06*** 0.000212***
(1.98e-07)
(1.18e-05)
-7.93e-08*** -4.35e-06***
(9.01e-09)
(4.29e-07)
0.0117
4.717***
(0.0365)
(1.563)
0.214***
0.682
(0.0386)
(1.860)
0.196***
0.149
(0.0213)
(0.937)
0.556***
-2.934**
(0.0292)
(1.265)
0.788***
11.32***
(0.0465)
(1.994)
1.207***
14.47***
(0.0553)
(2.339)
-0.374
-81.43***
(0.247)
(11.38)

48,911
49,179
0.212
0.509
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

49,179
0.827
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TABLE 10. Standard Inspection Outcome Estimates
VARIABLES
No. of Violations Total Penalty
Coal/Total Contributions

17.18***
(5.328)

16,753**
(7,916)

0.609**
(0.244)
-1.084***
(0.326)
1.331
(3.330)
0.391
(4.407)
-5.479*
(3.241)
-4.685**
(2.330)
-0.160
(1.078)
0.442
(0.323)
-1.907***
(0.415)
-0.829*
(0.480)
1.538*
(0.875)
8.566***
(0.539)
2.375
(2.416)
4.019**
(1.571)
-0.275
(0.969)
2.231***
(0.464)
-1.117**
(0.505)
11.55***
(2.659)
13.13***
(2.510)
-4.184***
(0.684)
-0.520
(0.729)
4.24e-05***
(3.03e-06)
-1.01e-06***
(1.08e-07)
2.086***
(0.427)
2.181***
(0.489)
1.018***
(0.239)
2.890***
(0.366)
5.017***
(0.540)
4.801***
(0.630)
-14.91***
(2.641)

-122.5
(364.2)
-716.4**
(338.9)
11,855
(11,573)
-4,403
(11,597)
-14,190
(10,730)
-11,853**
(4,708)
-5,693*
(3,400)
-843.0
(631.4)
-1,348
(897.3)
1,180
(1,142)
-2,033*
(1,127)
4,420***
(799.0)
13,408
(8,300)
3,738
(2,788)
-2,399
(1,463)
94.13
(930.1)
-440.3
(695.5)
13,520***
(3,684)
13,007***
(3,137)
-4,127***
(944.5)
-1,709*
(946.3)
0.0436***
(0.00635)
-0.00110***
(0.000193)
1,753***
(583.4)
839.3
(856.3)
154.8
(220.0)
550.6
(373.1)
11,461***
(1,104)
10,065***
(1,148)
-17,773***
(3,836)

Number of Violations
No. of Active Sections Inspected
No. of Idle Sections Inspected
No. of Shaft/Slope Sinking
Construction Areas Inspected
No. of Impoundment Construction
Operations Inspected
No. of Building Construction
Sites Inspected
No. of Draglines/Shovel Construction
Operations Inspected
No. of Other Unclassified Construction Sites Inspected
Records Inspected
Surface Area/Underground Mine
Inspected
Surface Mine/Facility Inspected
Identified Refuse Piles Inspected
Outby Areas Inspected
Major Construction Operation
Inspected
Shafts/Slopes Inspected
Identified Impoundments
Inspected
Explosives Storage Inspected
Misc. Areas Inspected
Anthracite Coal
Bituminous Coal
Surface Mine
Facility Mine
Cycle Employment Hours
Cycle Production
Miner Act Passed
Republican Congressman
2004 Cycle
2006 Cycle
2008 Cycle
2010 Cycle
Constant
Observations
R-squared

49,179
49,179
0.515
0.190
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Total Penalty
-2,762
(5,842)
1,136***
(111.5)
-814.2***
(224.1)
515.1**
(260.7)
10,342
(9,833)
-4,847
(7,752)
-7,965
(7,415)
-6,531**
(2,632)
-5,511**
(2,618)
-1,345***
(483.9)
819.3
(775.1)
2,122**
(940.9)
-3,780***
(917.7)
-5,313***
(1,052)
10,710*
(5,915)
-829.3
(2,258)
-2,087**
(908.7)
-2,441***
(761.5)
828.7
(540.0)
391.2
(1,237)
-1,914*
(1,147)
626.4
(792.2)
-1,118
(696.6)
-0.00457
(0.00307)
4.99e-05
(7.04e-05)
-617.5
(603.3)
-1,639***
(485.6)
-1,002***
(309.1)
-2,733***
(672.4)
5,760***
(872.7)
4,610***
(1,024)
-826.8
(1,217)
49,179
0.439
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TABLE 11.

Negligence Determination Estimates
No
Low
Moderate
High
VARIABLES
Negligence Negligence Negligence Negligence
Coal/Total Contributions

-0.00314
(0.00333)
Republican Congressman -0.000702***
(0.000196)
2004 Cycle
-0.000374
(0.000371)
2006 Cycle
-0.000986***
(0.000335)
2008 Cycle
-0.000253
(0.000343)
2010 Cycle
-0.000598*
(0.000329)
Constant
0.00265***
(0.000329)
Observations
R-squared

0.0708**
(0.0301)
-0.0418***
(0.00180)
-0.00600**
(0.00266)
-0.0179***
(0.00263)
0.0175***
(0.00286)
0.0269***
(0.00280)
0.110***
(0.00258)

0.163***
(0.0338)
0.0396***
(0.00204)
0.00812***
(0.00304)
0.0209***
(0.00307)
-0.0198***
(0.00314)
-0.0369***
(0.00312)
0.844***
(0.00288)

726,434
726,434
726,434
0.000
0.009
0.008
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Reckless

-0.231***
(0.0196)
0.00331***
(0.00122)
-0.00207
(0.00163)
-0.00222
(0.00182)
0.00216
(0.00169)
0.0101***
(0.00180)
0.0418***
(0.00156)

0.000799
(0.00273)
-0.000357**
(0.000173)
0.000321
(0.000279)
0.000221
(0.000239)
0.000372
(0.000244)
0.000495**
(0.000239)
0.00105***
(0.000213)

726,434
0.002

726,434
0.000
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TABLE 12. Likelihood Determination Estimates
VARIABLES
Not Likely
Unlikely Reasonably Likely Highly Likely
Coal/Total
0.0159
-0.966***
Contributions (0.0132)
(0.0511)
Republican
-0.00499*** 0.0168***
Congressman (0.000747) (0.00254)
2004 Cycle
-0.00223** -0.0101**
(0.00107)
(0.00449)
2006 Cycle
-0.00213* -0.0186***
(0.00115)
(0.00461)
2008 Cycle
0.00301*** 0.0421***
(0.00107)
(0.00413)
2010 Cycle
0.00705*** 0.0538***
(0.00124)
(0.00409)
Constant
0.0274*** 0.600***
(0.00104)
(0.00400)
Observations
R-squared

726,424
0.001

0.963***
(0.0498)
-0.0111***
(0.00245)
0.0128***
(0.00441)
0.0190***
(0.00446)
-0.0462***
(0.00400)
-0.0596***
(0.00394)
0.361***
(0.00387)

-0.000795
(0.00701)
-0.000314
(0.000380)
-0.000709
(0.000607)
0.00136**
(0.000670)
0.000969
(0.000640)
-0.00110*
(0.000624)
0.00850***
(0.000603)

726,424
726,424
726,424
0.007
0.008
0.000
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Occurred
-0.0122***
(0.00343)
-0.000447**
(0.000214)
0.000224
(0.000319)
0.000368
(0.000337)
0.000175
(0.000336)
-0.000222
(0.000298)
0.00305***
(0.000298)
726,424
0.000
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TABLE 13. Severity Determination Estimates
VARIABLES
No Lost Days Lost_Days Permanent
Coal/Total Contributions
Republican Congressman
2004 Cycle
2006 Cycle
2008 Cycle
2010 Cycle
Constant
Observations
R-squared

0.420***
(0.0512)
-0.00251
(0.00251)
-0.0250***
(0.00477)
-0.0474***
(0.00489)
-0.0684***
(0.00440)
-0.105***
(0.00412)
0.213***
(0.00440)

-0.844***
(0.0634)
0.0617***
(0.00332)
0.0167***
(0.00549)
0.0269***
(0.00584)
0.0294***
(0.00534)
0.0366***
(0.00523)
0.651***
(0.00530)

0.321***
(0.0300)
-0.0290***
(0.00175)
0.00450*
(0.00247)
0.0128***
(0.00272)
0.0254***
(0.00260)
0.0408***
(0.00253)
0.0846***
(0.00229)

726,423
726,423
726,423
0.012
0.007
0.005
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Fatal
0.104***
(0.0234)
-0.0301***
(0.00140)
0.00377*
(0.00209)
0.00773***
(0.00235)
0.0136***
(0.00209)
0.0277***
(0.00222)
0.0520***
(0.00210)
726,423
0.007
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TABLE 14.

Magnitude Determination Estimates
Number Affected
VARIABLES
Due to Violation
Coal/Total Contributions
Republican Congressman
2004 Cycle
2006 Cycle
2008 Cycle
2010 Cycle
Constant

-1.839***
(0.659)
-0.222***
(0.0348)
0.0243
(0.0813)
0.0193
(0.0910)
0.350***
(0.0851)
0.313***
(0.0873)
1.985***
(0.105)

Observations
742,259
R-squared
0.001
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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TABLE 15. Contestation Estimates
VARIABLES
Change in Penalty
Coal/Total Contributions
Republican Congressman
2004 Cycle
2006 Cycle
2008 Cycle
2010 Cycle
Constant

5,862***
(753.8)
212.1***
(40.13)
129.8
(104.4)
99.73
(86.30)
-503.3***
(82.63)
129.9*
(72.74)
-859.0***
(88.78)

Observations
121,491
R-squared
0.008
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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